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I.Introduction.
In 1938 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) adopted regu-
lations which created a category of prescription drugs to be distributed only by
order of a physician or other licensed medical personnel. This categorization,
along with the extensive regulation of the approval, labelling and marketing
of human drugs, has substantially reduced the risks which accompanied self-
medication. However, the current regulatory regime does not place any limits
on physician prescribing. This shortfall in regulation fails to protect patients
from poor prescribing practices and exposes these patients to otherwise pre-
ventable adverse drug reactions (ADRs). Attempts to remedy this shortfall
have been unsuccessful. Under the existing Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act1
(FD&C Act) and its judicial interpretation in An~rican Pharmaceutical Ass 'n
v. Weinberge2, the FDA seemingly does not have the authority to regulate
physician prescribing practices.
This paper will examine the problem of adverse drug reactions in
the context of the current regulatory regime for prescription drugs. Section
II will describe the current regime, and Section III will examine its shortfalls
in dealing with adverse drug reactions. Section IV will suggest features which
should be added to the current regime which would protect patients from careless
prescribing practices, and Section V will examine the FDA's legal authority to
make such changes.
II.The Current Regulatory Regime.
The prescription drug category was created by the FDA through
regulations promulgated in 1938. These regulations were aimed at protecting
those unskilled in the uses of drugs and relied upon the manufacturer to decide
which drugs would be given prescription status such that consumers could not
purchase the drug without rst consulting a physician.3 The FDA enforced the
regulation by suing drug companies for mislabeling when it disagreed with their
categorizations.4
121 U.S.C. 321 etseq.
2377 F.Supp. 824 (D. D.C. 1974), ad per curiam, 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
3Peter Temin, The Origins of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions, 22 J.L. & EcON. 91(1979).
41d.
1Congress claried the legal status of prescription drugs in the 1951
Durham-Humphrey amendment to the FD&C Act.5 Instead of leaving the
categorization of a particular drug to the discretion of the manufacturer, which
lead to a lack of conformity and confusion when the same drug was given a
dierent status by dierent manufacturers, the amendment set guidelines for
drawing the line between over-the-counter and prescription drugs.6
The Durham-Humphrey amendment, which can be found in section
502(b) of the FD&C Act, lists factors that are considered when making the
decision to confer prescription status on a drug. These factors are (I) the drug's
toxicity or other potentiality for harmful eect, (2) its method of use, and (3)
its lack of safety except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law
to administer the drug.7 Accordingly, prescription drug status is
iven to habit forming drugs listed in section 502(d) and to new
drugs as a condition of their approval.8 Drugs with these characteristics are
dispensed only by order of a licensed practitioner.9 Prescription drugs must be
labelled in a way such that the prescribing physician, and not necessarily the
consuming patient, is made aware of its proper usage and apparent risks.10
All new drugs, whether prescription or over-the-counter, are tested
and reviewed before approved for human use. After pre-clinical testing, the
FDA must approve a claimed exemption for an investigational new drug (IND)
before research on use of the drug in human beings can begin. If the IN) is not
rejected, the manufacturer will test the drug in three phases. During phase I,
the drug is tested on one or two subjects (usually healthy) to determine drug
metabolism, excretion and, most importantly, safety. If there are no apparent
adverse eects which would limit the drug's use in humans, testing moves into
phase II where the drug is administered to a small number of patients with the
disease the drug is aimed to treat. If the drug, which has been deemed safe in
phase I, also is shown to be eective in phase II, the drug then will be tested
on hundreds of patients in controlled clinical trials in phase Ill.11
The results of clinical testing from all three phases are included in
a New Drug Application (NDA) which is then reviewed by the FDA and either
approved or disapproved. FDA approval will be granted only if the drug is safe
and eective, can be manufactured consistently, has benets which when used
properly outweigh its risks, and is accompanied by adequate labelling of proper
use and risk warnings.12 Once the drug is approved, physicians may prescribe
5Durham-I-fumphrey Amendment, 65 Stat. 648 (1951).
6Temin, supra note 3.
7FD&C Act, x502(b)(l)(B).
8Id., x503(b)(1)(A)&(C).
9Id., x503(b)(l )(C).
101d., x502(f); see also Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal.App.2d 340, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 322 (1963) (prescription drug manufacturer responsible only for getting adequate warn-
ing to physician, not for ensuring warning is translated to patient).
11SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCIf & TECHNOLOGY OF HOUSE COMM. ON
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S PROCESS
FOR APPROVING NEW DRUGS, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in Hurr & MER-
RILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW, 514-516 (2d ed. 1991).
121d. at 520.; FD&C Act, x505(d).
2the drug without limitation at their own discretion.
.The Problem of Adverse Drug Reactions.
Although clinical studies of new drugs are extensive - lasting several
years, involving hundreds of patients and costing millions of dollars - they do not
guarantee that the drugs are safe or that all side-eects have been discovered.
The limited number of and types of patients selected during these trials may be
insucient to predict the occurrence of adverse drug reactions (ADRs) in the
general population or in specic subgroups (such as the elderly).13 In addition,
ADRs may be revealed by the use of the drug in less controlled settings by
physicians with less skill, less training and less opportunity to adhere to the
suggestions in the labelling of the drug.14
Congressional investigators estimated that more than half of the
new drugs sold in the United States will cause severe or fatal ADRs after they
are approved by the FDA.15 Serious
ide-eects were dened in their study as any ADR which could
lead to hospitalization, increased length of hospital stay, severe or permanent
disability, or death.16 Heart failure, shock, convulsions, kidney failure, blood
disorders, birth defects, fetal toxicity and blindness were among the observed
ADRs.17 These ADRs have astounding health and nancial consequences. In
1969 it was estimated that one seventh of all hospital stays is devoted to the
care of drug toxicity running up an annual bill of $3,000,000,000.18 Presently,
it is estimated that up to 2 million patients are hospitalized each year and as
many as 140,000 people die from ADRs.19
Under section 505(k), the FDA has the authority to require drug
manufacturers holding an NDA to maintain records and make reports. The
FDA has used this authority to promulgate regulations which require prompt
reporting of serious adverse reactions.20 Upon a nding that an approved drug
has serious side-eects, the FDA has the authority under section 505(e) of the
FD&C Act either to withdraw the drug or to require additional warnings of
the danger to be placed on the label. Being the only options which the FDA
can exercise, the treatment of drugs with known adverse reactions essentially
is all-or-nothing: the drug is either completely removed from the market or it
remains on the market for physicians to freely
rescribe. In many situations neither will be an ecient choice.
13Peter H. Rein stein, R~porting of Adverse Drug Events: A Key to Postn~rketmg Drug
&~frty, 46 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 873 (1992).
14Drug Safety: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Govt. Operations,
88th Cong., 2d Sess.(1964)(statement of George Larrick, FDA Commissioner) reprinted in
Hurr & MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW, 522-524 (2d ed. 1991).
15FDA Drug Review Post Approval Risks 1976-85 (GAO/PEMD-90-15).
16Donald C. Dilworth, Half of FDA-Appro~d Drugs Show Harmil Side-Eects, TRIAL,
August 1990 at 14,15.
171d.
18Kenneth L. Melmon, Preventable Drug Reactions - Causes and Cures, 284 N. ENG. J.
MED. 1361 (1971).
19Doug Podolsky and Penny Loeb, Dangerous Drugs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
January 9, 1995 at 49,50.
2021 C.F.R. x314.80.
3The rst will deprive desperate patients of highly eective, albeit risky, drug
treatments. The second will expose the drug taking public to risks limited only
by physician discretion.
The approval and withdrawal process for prescription drugs as-
sumes that the drugs will be used properly.21 The current regime fails to provide
for the situation in which ADRs arise from physician misuse, even though poor
prescribing practices has been identied as a major cause of ADRs.22 Physi-
cians are prescribing too many pills without setting a therapeutic end point
inadvertently causing their patients to reach a toxic end point instead.23 They
are using excessive numbers of medications in vulnerable populations24 and are
prescribing drugs using information provided by the manufacturer's sales force,
rather than that contained in the FDA approved package inserts.25
The prescription drug category was created so that patients would
benet from the advice of their physicians when dealing with certain higher risk
drugs. However, the current regulatory framework inadequately deals with the
recognized problems of poor prescribing practices. Under this system the drug
consuming public is needlessly exposed to avoidable ADRs and subsequently
risks losing access to highly eective drugs.
v.Expanded Regulatory Regime: Restricted Drug Status
Recognizing that doctors are not always making informed decisions
when determining how to medicate, a regulatory system must be established to
standardize physician prescribing practices. A middle ground should be added
to the current all-or-nothing regulatory regime which would allow the FDA
to place restrictions on the use of drugs with harmful ADRs. Such a system
should eliminate the guesswork in prescribing, thus providing for a reduction
in ADRs without requiring the FDA to remove the drugs in question from the
marketplace.26
Instead of banning drugs outright or allowing physicians to pre-
scribe drugs freely, the FDA should promulgate regulations placing drugs with
a high risk of ADRs in a restricted category and allowing physicians to pre-
scribe restricted drugs only upon meeting specied conditions. Such conditions
would include mandatory laboratory tests which monitor for signs of known
ADRs, and limitations on the number of rells allowed on a given prescription
to ensure periodic re-evaluation of the patient's condition. Pharmacists would
not be allowed to dispense the restricted drug unless the results of the specied
laboratory tests were indicated on the prescription. In the case of exceptionally
21FD&C Act x505(d) requires the FDA to withhold approval if test results show that the
drug is not safe under conditions prescribed, recommended or suggested in proposed labelling,
and x505(e)gives the FDA the power to revoke approval if proven unsafe under these same
conditions.
22Melmon supra note 18.
23Id.
24Stephen B. Soumeral, Special Communication: Princ4~les of Educational Outreach ('Aca-
demic Detailing') to Improve Clinical Decision Making, 263 JAMA 549 (1990).
25Podolsky & Loeb, supra note 19 at 51.
26Hershel Jick, Adverse Drug Reactions: The Magnitude of the Problem, 74 J. ALLERGY
CLIN. IMMUNOL. 555 (1984) (Recognizing that many ADRs are preventable).
4toxic drugs, an additional safeguard could be added which required the physi-
cian's explicit approval of the drug therapy when test results fall below a stated
healthy threshold.
The FDA would have the discretion confer restricted status upon
a drug. Drugs which should be given immediate attention by the FDA are new
drugs, drugs with known serious side-eects, and drugs distributed to at-risk
populations.
Ideally, all new drugs would be given restricted status. The drug
would remain in this status for three years, the time in which serious risks are
usually identied.27 Such classication would enable the FDA and the manu-
facturer to better monitor for adverse eects otherwise missed in clinical trials.
Currently, the reporting of adverse eects is voluntary and it was estimated
that only 1 percent of all serious drug reactions are reported to the FDA.28
By requiring laboratory tests for evidence of toxicity from all new drugs, the
regulations would provide both the physician and pharmacist with more than
anecdotal evidence on which to base their reports thereby encouraging report-
ing. Such tests also would result in increased patient awareness, prompting the
patients to report any unusual reactions to their pharmacist or physician. An
obvious problem with restricting all new drugs is that the ADRs of these drugs,
if any, are not yet known. Running a battery of arbitrarily chosen laboratory
tests would waste health care resources: being time-consuming, expensive and
possibly unrevealing.
The FDA should categorize as restricted any drug which has a
narrow benet to risk ratio, i.e. drugs which are highly eective, yet have se-
rious ADRs. In this case the ADR will have been identied, and the FDA
would require monitoring for this ADR when the drug is prescribed rather than
completely withdrawing the drug from the market.An example of a drug for
which this treatment would be appropriate is the anti-epilepsy drug Felbatol.
Since its approval, ten people taking the drug have developed acute liver failure
and twenty-one people have developed aplastic anemia (a sometimes fatal bone
marrow disease). Of these people, seven have died. The drug's manufacturer,
Carter-Wallace, Inc., has issued warnings to doctors of these ADRs, recom-
mending weekly liver function tests during Felbatol treatment and the use of
this drug only in patients who have not responded to other treatments. Under
the current regulatory system these warnings may fall on deaf ears, allowing the
number of fatal reactions to increase and prompting the FDA to withdraw its
approval. However, under the proposed system these warnings would be imple-
mented through regulation: reducing the risk of liver failure while retaining the
availability to the 10,000 to 12,000 patients for whom this treatment is their
last resort. 29
Acute liver failure caused by Felbatol was observed across patient
27Donald C. Dilworth, Half of FDA-Approved Drugs Show Harm ll Side Eects, TRIAL,
August 1990 at 14.
28Doug Podolsky & Penny Loeb, Dangerous Drugs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
January9, 1995 at 51.
29Felbatol May Cause Acute Liver Failure, FDA CONSUMER, December 1994 at 3.
5populations. Other drugs, however, may have population-specic ADRs. In an
eort to conserve resources, the FDA's discretion to place restrictions on pre-
scription drugs would include requiring specied tests only for identied at-risk
populations. For example, in 1982 isotretinoin (Accutane) was approved for
the treatment of cystic.30 Since its approval, the drug has been contraindicated
in women who are or may become pregnant. Despite the warnings, as of 1988
62 birth defects attributable to the drug were reported and an estimated 1000
went unreported.31 In addition, it is estimated that the drug has caused be-
tween 700 and 1000 spontaneous abortions and has prompted between 5000 to
7000 induced abortions.32 While the exact numbers have been disputed, the
implications are clear. Women are an at-risk population who are not being pro-
tected suciently by educational programs and warnings of the manufacturer.
One explanation for the warnings' shortfall is that not all physicians will be
aware of the prescribing guidelines, and under the current regulatory scheme
these physicians are not easily identied. Instead of removing Accutane from
the market, the FDA could issue a regulation aimed at female patients allowing
the drug to be distributed to the patient one month at a time and requiring
a negative pregnancy test before each rell. These conditions would greatly
reduce the risk of administering the drug to pregnant women. Prescriptions not
accompanied by a pregnancy test would alert pharmacists to physicians who
are not in compliance and would provide opportunities to advise non-complying
physicians of the manufacturer's and the FDA's prescription guidelines.
The FDA should use these regulations to place restrictions on drugs
prescribed to the largest and most vulnerable patient population: the elderly.
The elderly comprise only 12 percent of the U.S. population, but consume over
33 percent of all prescription drugs.33 In addition, studies have shown that
patients over 65 suer ADRs more frequently than young adults. Suggested
reasons for their special vulnerability include changes incurred in the aging pro-
cess in pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics, the problem of polypharmacy
due to multiple pathology and problems of compliance.34Studies have estimated
that the frequency of ADRs in the elderly population could be reduced by as
much as 50% if physicians avoided prescribing inappropriate medication and
discontinued unnecessary treatment.35 To this end, regulations could be pro-
mulgated requiring periodic monitoring of elderly patients, especially those who
are prescribed contraindicated drugs.
By allowing the physician to prescribe the drug in question regard-
less of the test results, the physician would continue to make judgement calls
30Charles Marwick, FDA Ponders Approaches to Curbing Adverse Eects of Drug Used
Against Cystic Acne, 259 JAMA 3225 (1988); see also Robert S. Stern, V4iena Uniquely
Eective Drug is Teratogenic: The Case of Isotretinoin, 320 N. ENG. J. MED. 1007 (1989).
31Marwick supra note 30.
32Id
33Richard W. Sloan, Principles of Drug Therapy in Geriatric Patients, 45 AM. FAM.
PHYSICIAN 2709 (1992).
34C.M. Lindley et al. Inappropriate Medication is A Major Cause ofAdverse Drug Reactions
in Elderly Patients. 21 AGE AND AGEING 294 (1992).
35Id.
6based on his own training and experience. These regulations would work to
aid in the physician's judgments, ensuring that patients are monitored and that
information needed for the proper balancing of risk and benet during a cer-
tain course of treatment is gathered. Unlike regulations which would limit the
prescribing of drugs to physicians with special qualications, the proposed reg-
ulations would overcome the usual objections of the medical profession: these
regulations would not substantially limit the practice of any physician and would
not impose access problems for patients with a legitimate need for the medica-
tion.36
Admittedly, the proposed changes to the current regulatory frame-
work are not without costs. Foreseeable costs of these changes are the adminis-
trative costs of enacting the regulations and the costs of the required laboratory
tests. In is unlikely that the administrative costs in promulgating the regulations
would be any greater than those associated with removing a drug from the mar-
ket altogether. The laboratory tests, in theory, were being performed by most
physicians in the absence of the proposed regulations. Therefore, only those
tests performed by physicians with prior poor prescribing practices are properly
included in the cost of the new regulations. The benets of the proposed regu-
lations would be a decrease in the rates of ADRs that can be monitored through
laboratory testing, which would in turn reduce health care costs. The proposed
regulations also would reduce the number of highly eective drugs with serious
ADRs that the FDA otherwise would have removed from the market, eliminat-
ing the costs associated with black markets and unsupervised treatment.
V.The FDA's Legal Authority to Restrict Distribution of Prescrip-
tion Drugs
The FDA's authority to regulate prescription drugs is limited by
the provisions of the FD&C Act. In light of these provisions and their judicial
interpretation it is unlikely that the FDA currently has the authority to place
the proposed restrictions on prescription drugs.
In 1972, the FDA promulgated regulations restricting the distri-
bution of methadone to direct shipments from the manufacturer to a limited
number of approved institutions. These restrictions were challenged and de-
feated in A,m,rican Pharmaceutical Ass 'n v. 4~inberger.37 The FDA reasoned
that its authority under section 505(d) of the FD&C Act to refuse the approval
of an NDA that is not shown to be safe included the authority to restrict the
drug's distribution to reduce the likelihood of misuse. 38The court found, how-
ever, that the term safe in section 505(d) meant only inherent safety of the
drug when used in the manner intended, and not safety when used in other
manners.39 Further, the court held that any stage of the drug's genesis not
specically listed in section 505(d)(3), which deals with controls of the drug,
36Robert L. Kane & Judith Garrard, Changing Physician Prescribing Practices: Regulation
~ Education, 271 JAMA 393 (1994).
37377 F.Supp. 824 (D. D.C. 1974), a'd per curiam, 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
38377 F.Supp. at 828.
39Id.
7is presumably intended to be excluded from the FDA's authority.40 Because
the distribution stage is not listed, FDA does not have any authority it. The
court concluded that it was the intent of Congress to confer upon the FDA the
power to determine which new drugs should be permitted to enter the ow of
commerce, and to confer upon all licensed practitioners the power to dispense
controlled substances on an equal basis with all other approved distributors.41
On appeal, it was recognized that physicians and state-licensed
pharmacists [had] not been uniformly responsible in dealing with methadone...
and the FDA undoubtedly had genuine cause to believe that.. . eective reg-
ulation in the public interest necessitates authority on its part to restrict dis-
tribution channels.42 However, it was also recognized that under the current
statutory framework the argument must be addressed to Congress. Because
both the provisions of the FD&C Act and the concerns regarding physician ir-
responsibility are the same today as at the time of this judgment, it is apparent
that the FDA must look to Congress to grant it authority to restrict prescription
drug distribution by amending the Act.
The provisions of the FD&C Act which deal with the regulation of
medical devices could serve as a model for such a Congressional amendment.
Under section 520(e)(1)(B) of the FD&C Act, the FDA has the authority to
require that a medical dei~ice be restricted upon conditions that the Secretary
prescribes in a regulation, if because of its potentiality for harmful eect of its
use there cannot otherwise be reasonable assurance of its safety and eective-
ness. A similar provision would provide the FDA with authority to restrict
the distribution of prescription drugs. For example, the Amendment might be
drafted as follows:
The Secretary may by regulation require that a drug subject to section
502(b) be restricted to sale, distribution or use upon conditions as the Secretary
may prescribe in such regulation if, because of identied adverse drug eects,
the Secretary determines that there cannot otherwise be reasonable assurance
of its safety and eectiveness. No condition prescribed under this paragraph
may exclude a practitioner licensed to administer such drugs solely because the
person does not have other specied qualications.
Given the amount of resources needed to pass a Congressional
amendment and given the fact that a similar amendment was proposed to
Congress and never passed, the FDA should consider implementing the pro-
posed regulations through other channels.43 A non-statutory solution would
be limiting reimbursement for restricted drugs under Medicare, Medicaid and
private insurance systems. Reimbursement would be made for only those re-
stricted drugs that were accompanied by the appropriate tests. Insurers, would
have to bear the additional costs of the additional laboratory work. However,
40377 F.Supp at 829.
41377 F.Supp. at 830.
42American Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 530 F.2d. 1054, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(per
curium, McGowan concurring).
43The Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1979 would have authorized the FDA to restrict the
distribution of drugs. See S. Rep. No. 96-321, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
8by convincing insurers that paying for blood tests in the short term will decrease
the rate of ADRs and the cost of health insurance outlays in the long run, the
FDA should be able to convince the insurers to require these tests.
VI.Summary
The current framework for regulating prescription drugs does not
protect patients from poor physician prescribing practices and it subjects con-
sumers to unnecessary adverse drug reactions. An amendment to the current
FD&C Act, or coordination with insurers, would enable the FDA to regulate
the distribution of prescription drugs. Such regulation would reduce the rate of
ADRs and provide the FDA with an alternative to removing otherwise eective
drugs from the market.
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